Introduction
When Mehran Kamrava published the revised edition of Qatar: Small State, Big Politics in 2015, he noted that while many features of Qatari politics remained consistent, notable changes had occurred since the book’s first publication in 2013. These changes were primarily in three areas: the domestic sphere (particularly the transition of leadership from Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani following the former’s abdication), international relations (with Qatar expanding its foreign policy beyond traditional mediation roles to more assertive engagements in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere—all while remaining under the U.S. security umbrella), and the economy (especially in terms of infrastructural development in preparation for the 2022 World Cup).
If Kamrava’s observations in 2013 and 2015 justified the characterization of Qatar as a small state with “big politics,” then Qatar today can arguably be seen as operating in a realm of “mega politics.” As I finalize this analysis on May 14, 2025, Donald Trump is making his first official international trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, followed by a visit to Qatar. This sequence underscores Qatar’s evolving status in international politics and its growing significance in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. presidents’ first trips often reflect their foreign policy priorities; it is noteworthy that during Trump’s first term in 2017, his inaugural trip included Saudi Arabia, followed by Israel, Palestine, and European states—not Qatar. The inclusion of Doha this time indicates Qatar’s rising prominence, even if we consider only the past eight years since Trump’s first foreign visit. Of course, Qatar’s prominence to the U.S. is partly due to its role in U.S.-relevant foreign policies, such as its mediation and facilitation in Taliban and Israel negotiations.
Several developments have shaped the transformation of Qatar’s foreign policy profile: its substantial economic resources, its active role in regional diplomacy, its assertive and largely successful interventions in Syria, and its resilience during the 2017 Gulf crisis. Although Qatar had faced a diplomatic row in 2014, the 2017 crisis, which saw a full-scale blockade by three Gulf neighbors, was a much more severe and prolonged process. It lasted nearly four years and tested Qatar’s diplomatic and economic resilience. Doha survived and emerged with enhanced soft power, diplomatic capabilities, and regional influence. This experience further justifies my reinterpretation of Kamrava’s framing, moving from “big” to “mega” politics, reflecting Qatar’s ability to project influence well beyond what its small size would conventionally suggest.
Among the various dimensions of Qatar’s foreign policy, this study focuses on its mediation diplomacy—arguably the most distinct and consistent feature of its international engagement. While U.S. support and regional dynamics have enabled Qatar to act as a mediator, the country’s ability to sustain and institutionalize this role, from Taliban negotiations to recent Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks, reflects its success in institutionalizing such roles. This analysis aims to evaluate Qatar’s mediation efforts over the last decade, exploring how and why a small Gulf state has come to exceed its weight in the geopolitics of the Middle East and beyond.
