The war in Gaza has produced several new security dynamics in the region; the involvement of the Ansar Allah movement (the Houthis) in the war on Gaza has made the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden another burning front in this war.
All eyes are now on Yemen. The Houthis are expected to take some action in response to the Israeli bombing of the port of Hodeidah on July 20th, 2024. Similar to how the Lebanese Hezbollah responded, or claimed to have responded, to Israel's killing of Fouad Shukr on July 20th, 2024, by launching missile and drone attacks on targets deep within Israeli territory on August 25th, 2024.
Whatever the Houthis' response may be, it will be another episode in a larger conflict in the Red Sea region, which we can say began on November 19, 2023, when the Houthis seized the vessel Galaxy Leader while it was sailing in the Red Sea, claiming that it was owned by a company affiliated with an Israeli businessman.
Saudi Arabia is not far from this conflict; it is geographically entangled with the conflict zone and politically and security-wise engaged with the parties involved in this conflict.
On December 9, 2023, the Houthis declared a ban on all ships heading to or from Israeli ports and began attacking vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea using drones, missiles, and small boats. In response, on December 19, 2023, US Secretary of State Defence Lloyd J. Austin III announced ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ from Bahrain. This US-led initiative, involving multiple naval forces, aims to prevent the Houthis from disrupting maritime navigation in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The coalition initially included the UK, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, and Spain, with Denmark, Greece, Sri Lanka, and Singapore joining later.
However, following Austin's announcement, there were differing positions from this coalition's (presumed) members regarding the nature of their participation.
Amid these developments and positions, Western media reports have been highlighting Saudi Arabia's stance towards the OPG, which targets the “number one” enemy of Saudi Arabia, the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has shown no interest in this new coalition.
Reuters published a report one day after the announcement of OPG's establishment, on December 20, under the title "Riyadh reluctant to derail Iran detente over U.S. Red Sea taskforce" that stated: “Saudi Arabia's name was conspicuously – perhaps surprisingly – absent from a list of countries the United States announced as part of its new naval coalition protecting Red Sea shipping from Yemen's Houthi group.”
On the contrary, Saudi Arabia issued an official statement after the OPG Alliance launched its first strikes against the Houthis on January 11, 2024. The statement read: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is following with great concern the military operations taking place in the Red Sea region and the air strikes that targeted several sites in the Republic of Yemen." The statement added: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stresses the importance of maintaining the security and stability of the Red Sea region, where freedom of maritime navigation is an international demand due to its impact on the interests of the entire world. But, at the same time, it calls for restraint and avoiding escalation during the events unfolding in the region."
Saudi Arabia's stance on the OPG indicates its awareness of the growing complexities and dangers of facing the security and political dynamics in our region following the war in Gaza, which now require delicate balances in positions and decisions.
The Importance of the Red Sea for Saudi Arabia
The Red Sea region holds significant importance for Saudi Arabia from a geopolitical perspective. Economically, there are several strategic economic projects under Saudi Arabia's 'Vision 2030' that are located in the Red Sea area, such as the NEOM project, which is valued at $500 billion. This project is planned to be built in the Duba province in the Tabuk region, in the far northwest of Saudi Arabia, extending 460 km along the Red Sea coast. This project includes the creation of new cities and complete infrastructure for the region, including a port, a network of airports, tourist areas, industrial zones, cultural and artistic centres, and innovation hubs that support the business sector, in addition to developing various economic sectors. Moreover, under 'Vision 2030,' Saudi Arabia plans to invest in developing its oil ports on the Red Sea coast to serve as export outlets for all Gulf countries, avoiding passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
These promising economic ambitions of Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea region face significant security challenges originating from the same area. In the northern Red Sea, there are attacks launched by the Houthis and Iranian-linked Iraqi militias on the Israeli port of Eilat following the outbreak of the war in Gaza. In the western Red Sea, there is the civil war in Sudan, conflicts in the Horn of Africa, as well as piracy and smuggling activities in the Red Sea region.
Therefore, ensuring security and stability in the Red Sea region is a strategic interest for Saudi Arabia. This has led Saudi foreign policy regarding the crises in the Red Sea region to focus on the following pillars: First, seeking a just solution to the Palestinian issue based on the two-state solution; Second, striving to end the conflict in Sudan and resolve the crisis in the country according to the conditions and commitments of the Jeddah Declaration in May 2023; Third, seeking to resolve the Yemen crisis by the initiative announced by Saudi Arabia in March 2021; Fourth, supporting international and regional efforts to resolve disputes among the countries of the Horn of Africa.
Maintaining the truce with the Houthis
In the past four years, Saudi foreign policy has witnessed a significant shift towards adopting negotiation pathways to resolve disputes. This began with resolving differences with Qatar at the Al-Ula summit in January 2021 and Saudi Arabia's announcement in March 2021 of its initiative to end the Yemeni crisis, which calls for a complete ceasefire under the supervision of the UN. Then came the normalisation of relations with Türkiye, which accelerated after the visit of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Saudi Arabia in April 2022, followed by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to Türkiye in June 2022. This shift culminated in the normalisation of relations with Iran after a reconciliation agreement between the two countries, brokered by China in March 2023.
After the announcement of the Saudi initiative to end the crisis in Yemen, a series of negotiations took place between Saudi Arabia, which has been leading a military coalition to support the internationally recognised Yemeni government since 2015, and the Houthis, who had overthrown that government. These negotiations led to the declaration of a temporary truce between the two parties in April 2022, which is renewed every two months. Although the truce is fragile and has been marked by limited armed skirmishes between the two parties over the past two years, so far it has succeeded in stopping Houthi missile and drone attacks towards Saudi territory.
The most serious breach of this truce was the attack carried out by the Houthis in September 2023 with a drone, targeting Bahraini forces participating in the Arab coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen, stationed on Saudi Arabia's southern border with Yemen. The attack resulted in the death of a Bahraini officer and soldier and injured others.
Nevertheless, the repercussions of that incident were contained, and efforts were made to maintain the truce as much as possible. Saudi Arabia is well aware that the Houthis are looking for any excuse to break the truce and return to escalating the conflict with Saudi Arabia, to "blackmail" Saudi Arabia and the international and regional parties interested in achieving peace in Yemen and gaining new concessions from those parties.
After the Israeli strike on the Hodeidah port, some social media accounts linked to the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of opening its airspace to Israeli warplanes. Saudi Arabia strongly denied these allegations.
On the other hand, the Houthis consider their involvement in open conflicts their only opportunity to evade their obligations towards the Yemeni people. The Houthis have failed to solve any of the problems facing the Yemeni people, which have been worsening since the Houthis seized power in Yemen in 2015.
The leaders of the countries participating in the OPG (Operation Prosperity Guardian) coalition have clearly defined the aims of this alliance, stating that it focuses solely on preventing the Houthis from attacking international maritime navigation lines in the Red and Arabian Seas. They have no concern with the crisis in Yemen or with the Houthis' other armed activities that threaten the rest of the region. This means that Saudi Arabia will not gain any security advantage from this alliance. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's trust in the US and the West has weakened after they abandoned and left it alone to face the Houthi threats of Iran and its arm, the Houthis, since 2015. On the contrary, Biden began his presidency in 2021 by cancelling the decision of his predecessor Trump's administration to designate the Houthis as a "Foreign Terrorist Organisation” on the pretext of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to Yemen. On January 17, 2024, the Biden administration decided to designate the Houthis as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organisation".
These factors explain why Saudi Arabia has distanced itself from the OPG coalition. The last thing Saudi Arabia wants is for Houthi missiles and drones to resume threatening Saudi territory and its economic installations. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is reluctant to be part of a coalition that most people in the region perceive as being formed to protect Israeli interests.
On December 25, 2023, The New York Times published an article titled "Hoping for peace with Houthis, Saudis keep a low profile in Red Sea conflict," which stated: "Saudi Arabia, however, would rather watch these latest developments from the sidelines, with the prospect of peace on its southern border a more appealing goal than joining an effort to stop attacks that the Houthis say are directed at Israel – a state the kingdom does not officially recognise and which is widely reviled by its people."
Bahrain's joining the OPG is sufficient
Bahrain's joining the OPG and taking it as the main headquarters for this coalition helps balance Saudi Arabia's stance on the coalition and will ease Western criticism directed at Saudi Arabia for distancing itself from this alliance.
All know that Saudi-Bahraini relations are now at a high level of strategic alliance, existential linkage, and the unification of positions and foreign policies. This is especially evident after the Saudi stance on the disturbances that occurred in Bahrain in 2011, when Saudi Arabia played a major role in restoring security and stability in Bahrain. Bahrain holds an important status in Saudi Arabia's national security considerations.
Bahrain also considers Saudi Arabia a major regional power with which it consults regarding important political, security, and economic issues. This means Bahrain's decision to join the OPG coalition was likely made in coordination with Saudi Arabia. In the same context, if Bahrain requires any form of military or logistical support from Saudi Arabia due to its involvement in the OPG, we cannot imagine that Saudi Arabia would hesitate to provide such support to Bahrain.
As a conclusion, achieving security and stability in the Red Sea region is very important for Saudi Arabia, and it is ready to engage in regional and international efforts to achieve this. However, Saudi Arabia is not inclined anymore to participate in short-term Western projects or those with unclear objectives, such as OPG. The new orientations of Saudi policy favour regional understanding and cooperation to solve problems and crises. Saudi Arabia is no longer enthusiastic about solutions coming from outside the region. In the post-Russian-Ukrainian war world, the direction of Saudi policy has shifted from aligning with US and Western policies to aligning with Saudi interests, while maintaining as much balance as possible between the two. Within the framework of these interests, Bahrain remains an important consideration in Saudi national security interests. As well as the strategic relations and high level of policy coordination between the two countries, they can be used to balance Saudi policies and positions.
