The Baath Party regime led by Saddam Hussein ended when U.S.-led coalition forces invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003. With the overthrow of the Baathist regime, not only a political regime but also the institutional structure, social balance and security architecture in Iraq changed completely. This process, initiated by the U.S. administration under the claim of “exporting democracy,” has failed to establish a stable, participatory, and inclusive order, even after 22 years. Iraq remains in a state of transition today. However, there is still social and political uncertainty about the direction, duration and ultimate goal of this transition. In this context, Iraq’s past two decades can be seen as a prolonged “in-between” period, marked by structural instability, insecurity, and foreign interventions, rather than the democratic consolidation typically seen in transitional processes.
Identity-based fragmentation of political space
Although Iraq’s post-invasion political system offers a democratic framework in theory, in practice, it has evolved into the political power sharing concept of Muhasasa system based on sectarian and ethnic compromises among political elites. In this system, ministries, governorships, and security units are distributed among ethnic and sectarian groups through negotiations. As a result, group identity and loyalty, rather than merit or public interest, have become the deciding factors.
This structure not only hinders the functioning of the state but also facilitates the spread of corruption. According to international organizations such as Transparency International, Iraq ranks among the worst countries in terms of public corruption. In this context, the primary concern of the political elites is to maintain control over the distribution of resources, rather than focusing on the system’s ability to generate legitimacy. As a result, the new structure perpetuates itself in a cycle.
The October 2019 demonstrations can be considered the strongest grassroots opposition to the existing political order. The protests, particularly in the southern provinces, were sparked by unemployment, corruption, poor public services, and a crisis of political representation. The demonstrations quickly took on an anti-system character. Hundreds of civilians lost their lives during the protests, and the harsh response from security forces highlighted the deepening divide between the people and the state. Despite this, the multi-member constituencies model used in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections allowed the October demonstrators to participate in the political process through parliamentary politics. As a result, the demonstrators were drawn into the political system, and their presence on the streets diminished. However, the failure to maintain the multi-member constituencies model in the upcoming 2025 parliamentary elections could negatively impact the political representation of these demonstrators.
Security sector confusion
One of Iraq’s most significant crisis areas in the post-invasion period has been the fragmented nature of its security architecture. The security vacuum that followed the 2003 invasion paved the way for the rise of numerous non-state armed groups. The 2014 takeover of Mosul by the terrorist group DAESH was not only a sign of security weakness but also a clear indication of the state’s diminished sovereignty. Although DAESH’s armed presence was largely eliminated by 2017, the group’s cellular structure remains intact and continues to pose a threat in certain regions.
Established under the claim of filling the security vacuum after the defeat of the terrorist group DAESH, Hashd al-Shaabi has evolved into not only a military force but also a political and economic actor. In fact, Falih al-Fayyad, head of the Hashd al-Shaabi Commission, has described it as a military force with ideological and political dimensions. The groups within Hashd al-Shaabi that maintain close ties with Iran have become the most powerful elements in the structure, leading to increased foreign influence in Iraq’s domestic politics. In this context, Hashd al-Shaabi’s ability to operate independently from the central authority, despite being part of the official security framework, exacerbates the country’s sovereignty issues.
Economic potential and realities
Iraq, the second-largest member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), finances more than 90 percent of its national budget through oil export revenues. This heavy reliance on oil makes the Iraqi economy vulnerable to external factors. Additionally, oil revenues have become a temporary source of financing, which prevents the country’s domestic structural problems from being addressed.
Another fundamental issue facing the Iraqi economy is the underdevelopment of key production sectors. Areas such as agriculture, industry, and technology have been largely neglected, while the public sector has become the primary source of employment. According to data from the Statistics Office of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning for 2020-2021, approximately 60 percent of the country’s workforce is directly or indirectly employed in public sector jobs. This situation not only burdens the public budget but also hinders the development of the private sector.
The economic reform programs and large-scale infrastructure projects announced following the October 2019 demonstrations aim to boost economic diversification. The Development Road Project, initiated under Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, seeks to transform Iraq into a trade corridor connecting the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. However, as the project is still in the construction and planning stages, its impact on the daily lives of the people remains limited. In this context, Iraq’s economic reality depends not only on increasing revenue sources but also on how these resources are managed, how they are distributed, and what kind of social transformation they are intended to foster.
Social dynamics
Since the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980, the last four decades of Iraqi society have been marked by wars, embargoes, occupations, and internal conflicts. These events have weakened not only the physical infrastructure but also the social fabric. However, this fragility has not led to an absolute collapse; instead, it has fostered a strong culture of survival and resistance in many areas. In particular, local communities, such as tribes, established internal solidarity networks to provide basic services, creating alternative social structures in the face of state weakness. At the same time, this situation has challenged state authority. Despite the resilience of these communities, a sense of fatigue and insecurity has spread throughout Iraqi society over time. The state’s inability to provide basic services, persistent corruption, and crises of political representation have eroded Iraqis’ faith in the system. The demands voiced by young people, especially during the October 2019 demonstrations, extended beyond economic concerns. This is reflected in the decline in voter participation in Iraqi elections. Moreover, the symbols, slogans, and new media tools used during the protests revealed that Iraqi youth have developed a political consciousness distinct from that of previous generations.
Despite the numerous pressures, signs of social transformation in Iraq can be seen, particularly in the areas of youth, civil society initiatives, and cultural production. The new generation, which is increasingly visible in universities and digital platforms, is developing a political stance rooted in universal values such as individual rights, freedom of expression, and social justice, rather than sectarian or ethnic identities. This shift could lay the foundation for long-term changes in Iraqi politics.
An Iraq in between
The last two decades in Iraq have gone beyond a typical transition, marked instead by structural uncertainty. Sectarian and ethnic power-sharing within the political system has become entrenched, the state’s security authority has weakened, economic resources have been mismanaged, and a deepening crisis of representation and justice has emerged across social strata. Many governments that came to power with promises of reform have failed to address the root causes of the country’s structural problems. As a result, Iraq has not become a model of post-war reconstruction or a model of institutionalized democracy. However, Iraq’s future may not be merely a repetition of current crises. The growing political awareness among the younger population, the rising — albeit limited — visibility of civil society, and the shift in social demands beyond ethnic and sectarian identities all point to the potential for transformation in Iraq. Unless concrete progress is made in rebuilding central authority, strengthening sovereignty against foreign interference, and fighting corruption, the prospects for such a transformation will remain weak.
Iraq’s current situation resembles a permanent state of transition, shaped by deep-rooted structural problems rather than the temporary chaos that followed regime change. Therefore, to understand post-2003 Iraq, a framework of “in-betweenness” rather than “transition” comes to the fore. Iraq’s exit from this state of in-betweenness can be shaped by the nature of the state, its relationship with society, and its decision-making capacity based on its own internal dynamics, beyond legal arrangements.
