The Arab-Israeli conflict dates back to when the Cold War began (ignoring the militia conflicts during the Yishuv period), but it did not end with the end of the Cold War.
If one takes a look at the history of the conflict, the positions of the parties and their arguments, even without going into detail, traces of a typical Cold War conflict can be seen. This historical conflict incorporates some unique, important dimensions as well. First of all, the rivalry between the bloc leaders, classified as superpowers on the power scale of the region; the interests of regional powers; historical anti-Semitic, socio-political motives and social reactions stemming from the displacement following the declaration of the State of Israel, etc., stand out as determining factors in the course of conflicts. The history of interstate struggle increased the level of suffering to a great extent. Millions of Palestinians were displaced from the territories where they resided with refugee status and were left homeless; hundreds of thousands of Jewish people in various places of the world set themselves to seek a future in the newly established state of Israel. When the area that was claimed for the new state overlapped and could not be shared with that of Palestinian residents, one of the parties was revived and the other party suffered.
The referendum law that was brought forward before the current peace talks will transfer the decision-making ability and authority of government officials for cases of territorial exchange to the public and it will require that any potential peace agreement also include taking territorial exchange to a referendum.
However, the law has problematic points at various levels. This analysis will try to briefly explain the current political environment of Israel and the potential difficulties of the related law.
The Naftali Bennett phenomenon
Israeli politics entered a different stage following the general elections held in January 2013. Even if there has not been any change in the political parties that make up the triple coalition of the government, in its mainstream discourse or its leadership, new figures gained the right of representation in the Knesset. One of the figures who stands out most among those politicians is Naftali Bennett, Minister of Economy and Commerce in the current government. Imposing the referendum law on the coalition, Bennett has emphasized that he will pull out of the coalition if significant progress is not made to move it forward.
Born in Haifa in 1972, the young leader achieved substantial success in the elections on behalf of his party with his influential rhetoric and image. He increased the number of seats to 12 in parliament from only three seats in the 18th Knesset. The Habayit Hayehudi (Jewish Home) party is a nationalist-religious party on the political spectrum. The party has adopted a discourse that emphasizes the 370,000 Israeli citizen settlers in the West Bank and has the potential to have a more influential position in Israeli politics in the forthcoming process due to the contributions of its charismatic leader. Currently, Bennett's “solution plan” for the West Bank has made a great impact and influenced the settlers in the region. Briefly, the plan aims to annex area C, where predominantly Israeli settlers reside and to legally establish Israeli dominance there. Some 50,000 Palestinians live with the Israeli settlers in the same area and conferring Israeli citizenship on this group of people is a stage of the plan.
The discourse that Bennett has developed for the settlers is populist in nature. This populist speech is by no means new for Israeli politics. The potential size of the vote in the settlement area is quite sufficient for the political parties to define their discursive stance. In addition to the discourse that the HaBayit HaYehudi party, led by Bennett, developed for the region, the party has taken a new step by suggesting a referendum for the center-right and right wing electors, representing the dominance of current Israeli politics and in doing so, it steals that role from Likud, another rival close to center and also the head of the government.
Referendum disputes
Referendum disputes are not a recent phenomenon in Israeli politics. There were also disputes about a similar law in 2010. However, Israel's political culture is mostly against the use of a referendum. Theoretically, the referendum is not welcomed because of concern that it will represent a majoritarian understanding and the return of transference of authority. Deputies who are elected and authorized to be representatives in the Knesset for four years ironically attempt to “return” their authority to the public through the referendum. Another point is the pluralist political culture of Israel. Israeli politics has quite a colorful image in terms of its considerably low election threshold (1 percent until 1992 and currently just 2 percent). Although the system is frequently criticized in terms of creating relatively weak coalition governments, it is an important step to maintaining representative politics in a country where different groups have different priorities in terms of creating a pluralist democracy.
Contrary to the common view, the Referendum Law currently being proposed does not include the territories where settlers in the West Bank reside. Rather, it includes a regulation regarding the areas annexed beyond the borders before 1967. The law brings forwards the status of the “united” Jerusalem that was annexed and declared as the capital of Israel in 1980, as well as the status of the Golan Heights that were annexed in 1981. Accordingly, if East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights become a matter of negotiation in a peace treaty, the decision will be made as a result of a referendum. Not including the settlers in the West Bank in such a referendum led to a reaction from the Likud party. In Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's statement, “a couple of square meters of territory in Jerusalem” will be included in potential agreements, he asserted that the referendum option is on the table and that the opposition within the party was pacified.
There is a strategic perspective developing each day in Israel on the West Bank territories beyond the Green Line that was set out in the 1949 Armistice Agreement. The perspective has been mentioned and argued by many politicians. Politicization of a military strategy and the military being engaged in political discourse indicates an important dimension of militarization in Israeli society. This militarized discourse is not found to be strange, but rather, it is supported. The strategic security discourse helps legitimize unanticipated but necessary acts and paves the way for defensive securitization. The territories to be subjected to the approval of the Referendum Law include the areas that are considered important for the national security of Israel.
Another problematic point of the law is that it could contradict with the Basic Law. At this point, the allegations of Mohammed Wattad, an Israeli Arab politician and former member of the Knesset, are important. Wattad, who notes that the Knesset and Government Laws – to be recognized as the Basic Law as a result of the referendum law to be enacted — will contradict each other, says that the decision-making authority to be transferred through referendum belongs to the Knesset and the government puts an emphasis on the superiority of the Basic Law.
Conclusion
The populist characteristics of Israeli politics comes to the fore with the Referendum Law. Political parties will not be solely responsible for the exchange of territories in possible peace agreements and will be able to attribute integrative meanings centered on national consensus to new decisions made through a referendum. This is a step which could prevent political parties from being “wasted” in political terms. I would like to add a brief note about the peace talks. Considering the current focal points of Israeli politics and particularly the attitude seen in the reactions of Likud, the leader of the coalition, it cannot be suggested that there is an appropriate foundation in Israel for the peace talks. The “gesture” of the release of 104 Palestinian prisoners is actually a strategic decision that was presented as “the lesser of two evils,” and was taken to prevent the imposition of pre-1967 frontiers as a precondition to the talks and to prevent damaging Israel's prestige in the international arena. Although relaunching the peace talks increases public hope, the outcome could be completely theatrical.
